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PRESUMPTIVE ADAPTATION AND
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

Abstract
Adaptation almost invariably accompanies the cross-border transfer of firm specific
practices. The existing literature contains two conflicting approaches to adaptation. The first,
more traditional approach, following institutional, motivational, and pragmatic efficiency
considerations, presumes that a modified practice can be fine tuned, stabilized, and
institutionalized without consulting a working example and that practices should thus be adapted
as quickly as possible to create fit with the local environment. The second approach argues,
instead, for the need to maintain the diagnostic value of the original practice by adapting
cautiously and gradually. In this paper, we report an in-depth field investigation of the
relationship between presumptive adaptation, adaptation that removes the diagnostic value of the
original practice, and transfer effectiveness. The setting is the transfer of franchising knowledge
across borders. We investigate how adherence to recommended practices affects the rate of
network growth in the host country. We find that presumptive adaptation stalls network growth
while a conservative approach to adaptation, which basically entails close adherence to the
original practice, results in remarkably rapid network growth. We conclude that presumptive
adaptation of knowledge assets could be detrimental to performance.
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PRESUMPTIVE ADAPTATION AND
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

Empirical evidence confirms that some degree of adaptation almost invariably
accompanies the cross-border transfer of firm-specific practices (Onkvisit & Shaw, 1987). For
example, both human resource and marketing practices have been found to vary widely within
firms across national boundaries ( Douglas & Wind, 1987; Robert, Probst, Martocchio, &
Drasgow, 2000; Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). However, this raises the question of how units
are affected by the adaptation; indeed, there are conflicting rationales concerning the appropriate
approach to conducting successful adaptations of organizational practices.
One approach relies on institutional (Kostova & Roth, 2002), motivational (Morosini,
Shane, & Singh 1998), and pragmatic efficiency considerations which suggest that the
organizational practices should be adapted as quickly as possible to closely match local
environmental characteristics (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Lieberthal, 1998). This
typically involves significant changes to multiple aspects of the practice. The alternative
approach notes the complexity and causal ambiguity inherent in most practices (Rivkin, 2000) as
well as ex-ante uncertainty as to the relevant environment (Westney, 1987; Penrose, 1959;
Leonard-Barton, 1988) and suggests the need to preserve the diagnostic value of the original
practice (Jensen & Szulanski, 2005; Winter & Szulanski, 2001), indicating that adaptation should
proceed cautiously and gradually in carefully designed steps that ideally involve only a single
change at a time.
Extensive adaptations, involving two or more simultaneous changes, are based on the
presumption that the modified practices can be fine-tuned, stabilized and institutionalized
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without referring back to a working example. When this presumption is true, such adaptations
enhance the effectiveness of knowledge transfer. However when this is not true, presumptive
adaptation may severely degrade effectiveness.
In this paper we report a naturally occurring, repeated-treatment quasi-experiment that
isolates the effect of presumptive adaptation on transfer effectiveness. The setting is Mail Boxes
Etc. (MBE) in Israel. MBE (now the UPS Store) is the largest non-food franchise organization
in the world, with over 3,900 outlets in the U.S. and over 1,100 outside of the U.S. The
investigation covers the period from August 1995, when the MBE franchise network in Israel
was established, until July 2001. We systematically document how the approach to adaptation
(presumptive or otherwise) affects network growth.
We begin by discussing the theory behind presumptive adaptation and constructing
alternative hypotheses about the effects on transfer effectiveness. We then explain the setting
and methodology as a preamble to an in-depth account of MBE Israel‟s approach to adaptation
and the observed level of growth of its network. Finally, we evaluate the data in terms of a
naturally occurring, repeated-treatment quasi-experiment, concluding with a discussion of the
implications of this research on managing efforts to leverage knowledge assets.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The Need for Adaptation
One of the central issues in the cross-border transfer of firm-specific resources, including
knowledge resources (Kostova, 1999; Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998), is whether or not and to
what extent the firm should adapt the resources to fit local conditions (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989;
Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Fit with the environment is argued to be essential not only for subsidiary
success but also survival (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Sorge, 1991) and streams of literature in
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organizational theory (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Scott, 2001), international
business (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Griffith Hu, & Ryans, 2000; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997;
Prahalad & Doz, 1987), and international marketing (Cui & Liu, 2001; Yan, 1994) have
suggested that adaptation is necessary in order to ensure fit with the relevant characteristics of
the local environment, which typically differ from those in the source environment along a
number of critical institutional and market dimensions.

The Presumptiveness of Significant Adaptation
While it is sensible that the subsidiary, and hence transferred practices that it uses, must
achieve fit with the local environment, focusing solely on fit creates a potential dilemma.
Specifically, conventional wisdom often assumes that transferred practices are fully understood
and transferred without difficulty. This may be true for relatively simple practices, however,
many practices are at least moderately complex (Rivkin, 2000) and/or causally ambiguous
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). As a result, even with experience neither the multinational firm
(MNC) nor the subsidiary may fully understand the practice nor be able to completely codify it,
making it sticky, or difficult, to transfer (Szulanski, 1996; von Hippel, 1994).
This complicates the adaptation process making any adaptation at least somewhat
presumptive. This is particularly true for significant adaptations, those containing two or more
simultaneous, discrete changes, because such changes complicate the cause and effect
relationship exponentially. This makes it difficult to attribute specific effects to their specific
alterations and creates potential unforeseen interactions between the adapted and un-adapted
components and between the modified components themselves. In addition, there may be
unforeseen interactions, even for experienced local managers (Westney, 1987), between the
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practice and the relevant host environment as the relevant and the anticipated environments often
differ due to incomplete information, and to mutual adaptation between the practice and the
relevant environment (Leonard-Barton, 1988; Penrose, 1959; Burgelman, 1983). Such problems,
moreover, are likely to extend to any significant adaptation effort, even those occurring posttransfer.
Indeed, if any significant adaptation effort is to succeed, one must presume that the
implemented practice can be made to work despite the diminished capacity, or even loss, of the
original as a referent. Following this line of thinking, we define as presumptive any adaptations
involving two or more simultaneous changes that are of sufficient magnitude to render the
template site, or previously working version of the practice, of little diagnostic value.

Presumptive Adaptation and Transfer Effectiveness
Current literature regarding presumptive adaptation takes two opposing stances: (1) that
presumptive adaptation will increase the performance of the subsidiary implementing the
practice and (2) that presumptive adaptation will decrease the performance of the subsidiary
implementing the adapted practice.
Presumptive Adaptation Increases Subsidiary Performance. The traditional literature
addressing the adaptation of firm-specific assets implies that anticipating the relevant
characteristics of the local environment is the most critical aspect of successfully transferring
firm assets to local subsidiaries (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). This
argument is explicit in recent work focusing specifically on the transfer of organizational
practices. For instance, concerning human resource practices, significant adaptation is explicitly
argued to increase acceptance of the knowledge being transferred. A practice that is adapted
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comprehensively to match cognitive and normative institutions presumed relevant in the host
environment becomes both more understandable and more acceptable to the local labor force
responsible for its implementation (Griffith et al., 2000; Kirkman, Gibson, & Shapiro, 2001;
Kostova & Roth, 2002; Luo, 2000; Morosini et al., 1998).
For a modified practice to be understood and accepted, however, substantial adaptations
must usually occur sharply, either in a single step or within a relatively narrow window (Tyre &
Orlikowsky, 1994). Creeping, gradual adaptation is typically resisted (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).
Thus, traditional arguments presume that the need for quick fit with the environment is more
important than comparability with the template, or original practice. The idea that increased
implementation is due to closer fit leads to the stance that presumptive adaptation will result in a
greater ability to transfer organizational practices and hence, increased subsidiary performance.

Hypothesis 1a: Ceteris paribus, presumptive adaptation will enhance subsidiary
performance.

Presumptive Adaptation Decreases Subsidiary Performance. In opposition to
traditional literature, however, an increasing number of observations from actual transfers of
organizational practices show that firms increasingly shun drastic departures from existing
practices. In fact, these firms often postpone most modifications until after adequate experience
has been gained with the original practice in the host environment or until comparable results are
obtained, with incremental adaptations of selected aspects of the practice occurring thereafter
(Financial Times, 1997; Great Harvest Bread, 1999; McDonald, 1998). This anecdotal evidence
raises questions about the desirability of presumptive adaptation.
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In most transfers of practices, the implementation of the practice at the recipient site is
typically an iterative process where the original template site or working example is used as a
reference to diagnose and solve problems that arise at the recipient site during transfer and
implementation (Gielens & Dekimpe, 2001; Jensen & Szulanski, 2005; Winter & Szulanski,
2001). Presumptive adaptation, whether it occurs at the time of a transfer or later, by definition
involves alterations of sufficient magnitude that the comparability between the modified practice
and the original is reduced, thus diminishing the value of the original practice as a referent when
diagnosing and solving problems in the new setting. Presumptive adaptation thus rejects the
information value of the template presuming instead that implementation, due to a close fit with
the environment, will occur smoothly enough that the practice can be transferred without
reference. However, if the transfer does not occur smoothly, presumptive adaptation may
severely degrade the performance of the implemented practice leading to poorer subsidiary
performance.

Hypothesis 1b: Ceteris paribus, presumptive adaptation will hamper subsidiary
performance.
METHODS
Setting
Franchising. The general setting for our study is multinational franchising. Multinational
franchise organizations, as a subset of MNCs, are particularly interesting settings to study
presumptive adaptation. Because they serve individual customers they are subject to strong
pressures for local adaptation. Moreover, transferring knowledge across international borders
increases the variance of adaptation choices due to amplified isomorphic forces which increase
the impetus to adapt (Sorge, 1991). In addition, multinational franchise organizations, are well
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suited for studying issues of organizational knowledge transfer (Nelson & Winter, 1982) because
they compete primarily through growth, first by increasing the number of outlets during the
expansion phase and then, once the network has reached the carrying capacity of its
environment, by managing same store revenue growth through the replication of best practices.
For both forms of growth, the transfer of knowledge between geographic locations plays an
important role. This allows us to more clearly observe the incidence of decisions concerning
presumptive adaptation.
Furthermore franchise organizations operate across an arms length interface with their
franchisees and cannot completely enforce how these franchisees receive and use the knowledge
being transferred (Bradach, 1998; Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998), with rescission of such
agreements being a dramatic, costly, and undesirable event. Enforcement is even less likely
between franchisors and Master Licensees (MLs), the people who purchase the right to develop a
network for an exclusive geographic territory, because deviations from the type of knowledge
transferred to MLs are often more tacit and less critical for the identity of the brand. This allows
for greater variation in adaptation decisions than one might find in company owned stores or
subsidiaries where the company can resort to fiat to enforce compliance with a particular set of
practices (Williamson, 1975). The greater the variation in adaptation decisions the higher the
incidence of presumptive adaptation is likely to be, making transfers of organizational practices
within multinational franchising ideal for our study.
Mail Boxes Etc. in Israel. The specific setting of our study is the Mail Boxes Etc.
(MBE) franchise system in Israel. MBE, the largest non-food franchisor in the world, was first
launched in 1980 in San Diego, California in an effort to fill a need for postal services. MBE
specializes primarily in services for the small office and home office environments, including
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photocopying, color copying, packing and shipping, parcel and express courier, complete
mailbox service, Internet access, and office and packing supplies. In 1986, when it went public,
MBE had grown to 250 franchise outlets. Four years later, in 1990, it had grown to over 1000
centers, and, by 1999, had quadrupled again to nearly 4000. After securing a strong foothold in
the United States and building a strong foundation of experience, MBE decided, in 1989, to sell
master franchise licenses abroad. By 1999 MBE was operating or had licensing agreements in
nearly 60 countries with over 700 international outlets.
This study examines the growth of the MBE network in Israel. MBE sold the rights to
build the MBE network in Israel to Albert Alhadef in August 1995. Eleven months later Albert
opened his first store. As they did with other MLs, MBE provided Albert with substantial
knowledge on how to develop an MBE network. This paper will focus exclusively on the
transfer of knowledge concerning the task of building an MBE network rather than that of
implementing the relatively more codified business concept within an MBE store.1
In retrospect, the history of the MBE Israel network could be viewed as a naturally
occurring, repeated-treatment quasi-experiment which allows us to make inferences about the
effect of presumptive adaptation on subsidiary performance, as measured by the growth in the
number of stores in the network. Furthermore, because we were granted complete access to the
ML management team, we could double check for emerging interpretations and thus rule out
many potential threats to validity when drawing our conclusions. Moreover, focusing on a single

1

We chose to study network growth rather than the operation of individual stores for a number of reasons.
First, it enables us to use a repeated-treatment, quasi-experimental research design rather than the non-equivalent
groups, post-test only design that the study of individual stores would require. The latter design is substantially
weaker in terms of internal validity. Second, while one could potentially overcome the inherent weaknesses of the
latter design, it would require a deeper level of access than was available. We had virtually unfettered access to
MBE Israel headquarters but had limited access to the individual franchisees, making it impossible to adequately
address the threats to validity that arise from the use of a non-equivalent groups post-test only research design. We
recognize, however, that adaptation of the business format may also affect network growth. We address this issue at
length later in our paper in our discussion of threats to validity.
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network allowed us to keep the environment constant, further enhancing internal validity by
eliminating a large class of confounding factors that could cloud the effect of presumptive
adaptation.
Relying on a single case, however, substantially increases the challenge of establishing
the generalizability of our findings, a challenge we address in two steps. First, we rely on our
broad exposure to the MBE internationalization experience to establish that the case of MBE
Israel is indeed representative of, and applicable to, other contexts within MBE. Second, we
argue that the case study serves as a potent counterexample to the seemingly pervasive
conviction that presumptive adaptation is generally desirable. The lessons we draw from this
example about the possible ineffectiveness of presumptive adaptation cannot be easily dismissed,
given the similarity of MBE‟s knowledge transfer processes with those occurring in other firms
and, especially, in franchise organizations.

Data Collection
We followed Yin (1989) concerning data collection, employing a descriptive case study
methodology during this stage of the research. Data collection occurred primarily through a
series of interviews with all of the relevant managers and employees at MBE headquarters and
MBE Israel as well as through extensive archival data gathering in both locations. After signing a
comprehensive confidentiality agreement, we had complete access to and cooperation from both
locations. In all cases the interviews were semi-structured and aimed at uncovering the role of
the ML, the knowledge transfer process, and the difficulties of expanding a franchise network
overseas, specifically focusing on the balance between following the approach recommended by
headquarters for developing a network versus creating one that is adapted to local needs. A
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description of the type and number of interviews is included in Appendix A. The CEO at MBE
Israel during the period of observation also completed a lengthy questionnaire as part of a wider,
but connected study. Monthly e-mails and telephone conversations occurred prior to and
following the on-site visits during the entire period of observation. The period of time tracked in
the field investigation is 1995 to 2001.
The data collection occurred in real time, negating any retrospective bias and involved
triangulation, enhancing the validity of the descriptions. To minimize observer effects, we were
careful not to intervene and offered no opinions or suggestions to the participants. The following
two sections detail how we measured presumptive adaptation and the growth of the network.
Presumptive Adaptation. We define presumptive adaptation as a significant adaptation
intended to create fit with the local environment. Significant is defined as the simultaneous
modification of two or more components of the original practice. We operationalize it as nonconformity to a standard approach following a method pioneered by Westphal, Gulati and
Shortell (1997), as explained below.
Establishing Intentional Departure from the Standard Approach. In line with Westphal, et
al. (1997), we establish non-conformity using both qualitative and quantitative indicators.
Westphal, et al. (1997) measure qualitatively the intention to conform through a self-reported
declaration of conformity to a “particular, standard . . . model” (p. 378). Accordingly, we verify
the existence of an intention to depart from the standard approach through interviews with the
MBE Israel management team and external observers (e.g., corporate liaisons). We asked general
questions about the process that MBE Israel was going through in establishing an MBE network
in Israel. As the participants brought up issues of adaptation, we probed the rationale underlying
the adaptation in addition to determining when and how the adaptation had occurred.
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To establish the degree of conformity (or lack thereof) to the standard approach, we
adapted the quantitative measure of conformity established by Westphal, et al. (1997). Their
measure is computed by breaking up a policy into its constituent practices and building a vector
of implemented practices to determine the percentage of practices that are actually implemented.
We utilize the same method, but rather than computing the percentage in relation to the number
of other units implementing the practices, we compute the raw number of constituent practices
implemented and compare that number to the standard approach recommended by MBE
headquarters. Our measure thus captures deviations from the standard rather than deviations
from the norm, although, as will be shown in the section on establishing correlation, the standard
and the norm are similar.
In determining whether a deviation has occurred, we utilize a cutoff point of one calendar
year. We chose this mark because one year is a period long enough to determine the vector of
actions chosen by the ML but not long enough to fully reveal the implication of the ML choices
on the performance of the network in order to trigger corrective action.
The Standard Approach to Growing an MBE Network. Concerning how to develop an
MBE network, MBE Headquarters provides recommendations to MLs on eight specific domains
of activity, (1) marketing the MBE franchise, (2) selling the MBE franchise, (3) training the
franchisees, (4) selecting sites, (5) designing and constructing MBE centers, (6) supporting the
franchisee, (7) developing infrastructure, and (8) managing the franchisor/franchisee
relationship. The eight domains can be considered “core” in the sense that nearly all potential
elements of the system for network growth are interdependent with them (Hannan, Burton, &
Baron, 1996; Siggelkow, 2002) and they have a sizeable impact on the shape of future
organizational elements (Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 1999).
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The instructions for the first seven of these domains are organized in the form of a
timeline known internally as the “52-week plan” that pertains to the initial year of the growth of
a network.2 The 52-week plan lists 330-335 actions, the number of actions depending on whether
the ML uses an area structure, to be taken by an ML, specifying their timing on a week by week
basis. It is the number of specific actions in the 52-week plan followed by the ML that constitute
the raw score mentioned in establishing departure from the standard approach.
It should be noted that the information contained in the 52-week plan, while codified, was
still complex and somewhat ambiguous. The information represented a compilation of dozens of
lessons learned through the building of the U.S. and other international networks. When specific
problems were encountered, the solution to those problems was incorporated as a task in the 52week plan. For instance, experience revealed that it was desirable to delay some types of
advertising until after the sixth week of network operation. Causal explanations of the
mechanisms by which those moves affected growth were not, however, codified into the 52week plan. Furthermore, the implications of advertising from day one or delaying it by six
weeks were addressed haphazardly, if at all. Such knowledge, instead of being codified, was
transferred predominantly through personal communication between MLs. Furthermore, the
interrelationship between various parts of the 52-week plan and the plan‟s applicability to
different environments was unknown, even by headquarters. The 52-week plan represented
codified local learning and no one had systematically mapped out the implications of altering or
abandoning parts of that plan. While such learning was partially available in the larger MBE
international network, again, it was only transferred unsystematically via personal
communication between MLs.
2

Our confidentiality agreement prevents us from revealing exact details of the 52-week plan.
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Instructions for the eighth domain, managing the franchisor/franchisee relationship, are,
of necessity, less specific. These instructions are expected to align actions with the “core values”
of MBE, which are sometimes referred to as the “family principle.”3 The essence of the principle
hinges on the fact that the franchise contract is a blunt governance tool that is inadequate to
rectify minor infringements. Termination of the franchise contract, which contract is normally
granted for a period of 10 years, is a costly and traumatic action that can be contemplated only in
extreme situations. Thus, contracts are of limited value in restraining undesirable minor
deviations in the behavior of the franchisee. Moreover, the threat of termination provides, at best,
a weak lever to induce franchisees to undertake specific actions, such as marketing their services
locally, investing in the remodeling of their store, or purchasing a new point of sale system. It
certainly does not obligate them to provide positive referrals to prospective franchisees in order
to help grow the network.
Since franchisees own their stores and their contracts cannot be terminated easily, the
franchisor cannot control franchisees as if they were salaried company employees. Rather, the
key task of the ML consists in empowering the franchisees so that they succeed in implementing
the franchise; the success of the franchisee is a prerequisite for the success of the ML. It is for
this reason that nurturing the franchisor/franchisee relationship means thinking of franchisees as
if they were family members, such direct comparisons often being made in training meetings and
materials, making persuasion the main means for effective governance.4
In order to determine the boundaries of the family principle, since its application is not as
clearly codified as the 52-week plan, we interviewed a number of employees in the international

3

See the Appendix B for further explanation.
The limitations of the contract as a governance tool and the fundamental importance of persuasion have
been recognized as critical to franchise systems in general (Bradach, 1998; Seid & Thomas, 2000).
4
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department at MBE headquarters and a sample of MBE MLs.5 Along with a more general
discussion of the application of MBE‟s core values, we specifically asked three questions: (1)
how would you deal with late royalty payments, (2) how have you dealt with late royalty
payments while you were building your network, and (3) how do you get franchisees to make
additional investments in their stores, such as remodeling, new equipment, etc. Using these
answers, we developed a profile of how the family principle is used at MBE. For example, some
ML actions correspond clearly to deviations from the standard way to manage the
franchisor/franchisee relationship. Examples of such actions are frequent threats of termination,
withholding support for minor reasons, and attempting to centralize activities that are normally
considered to be responsibilities of the franchisees, such as marketing locally in their territory.
Such actions conflict with the family principle, with the idea of working via persuasion rather
than fiat. We compared the actions of MBE Israel‟s ML, as well as other MBE MLs, with the
developed profile and computed a percentage of those who followed the family principle as
outlined in the appendix to determine whether a significant deviation from this principle had
occurred at MBE Israel.
Network Performance. Growth performance in early-stage franchise organizations is
best reflected by the number of franchises sold and stores opened (Bradach, 1998; Love, 1986).
Same store sales growth is generally not used as a measure of growth until the network reaches a
stable size and growth in the number of stores abates. The growth in the number of franchises is
a key measure of performance because it provides a vital revenue stream of franchise fee
payments from the sale of new franchise units. That revenue, in turn, funds the development of
the central infrastructure that is necessary to support the growing network of stores until royalty
5

The MLs interviewed in this regard include those from Poland, Mexico, Malaysia, Austria-Hungary, the
Caribbean, the U.K., Portugal, Singapore, Philippines, Central America, Andean region, France, Canada, Japan,
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payments from those centers are sufficiently substantial (Bradach, 1998). Network growth is not
only used by academics to measure early franchise performance, but is also one of the primary
performance metrics both at MBE and in other franchising organizations (Bradach, 1998).
Admittedly, using network growth as a performance metric may become problematic as a
franchise organization matures (Bradach, 1998),6 but in this study Israel was newly opened and
network growth is considered to be the most suitable measure. Growth was measured as the
number of new franchises sold by the end of each calendar quarter and was determined using
archival data.
THE EFFECT OF PRESUMPTIVE ADAPTATION
The MBE Israel experience falls into three distinct phases demarcated by decisions
concerning presumptive adaptation. What follows is a description of those three phases and the
results of the measurement of the presumptive adaptation and network growth variables.

First Phase
Albert Alhadef bought the rights to develop the MBE franchise network in Israel in August
1995. MBE, as they do with all MLs, began the process of replicating their successful network
in Israel with a series of intensive training sessions spanning multiple weeks. During these
training sessions, which included in-depth field experience, Albert was instructed in both
building and operating a network and in establishing and operating a successful MBE store.
MBE also aided Albert in the transfer of franchising knowledge by providing him with extensive
manuals detailing the codified knowledge of both how to build and run a franchise network as
well as an MBE store. Finally, to aid in implementing the system, MBE Headquarters ensured

Italy, and Turkey.
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that Albert was introduced to the global MBE network and given access to MLs in other
countries who could serve as sources of advice and example. The goal of the training, the
written materials, and the access to the network was transferring a proven system that had
worked in many environments world wide.
With this wealth of available knowledge Albert opened the pilot store7 in July 1996,
focusing on perfecting the sale of MBE services in Israel. From the beginning, Albert and the
staff members that he hired believed that the basic MBE approach to both the business format
and network growth had to be substantially adapted in order to be successful in Israel. Many of
the business services being offered in the United States were not even defined or established in
Israel. For example, the word “mailbox” had no meaning and the mailbox logo would mean
little for attracting customers.
Albert was concerned that the fit of the MBE concept in Israel was not tight enough to
attract sufficient numbers of franchisees to build a network. What initially attracted him to
MBE, however, was the potential flexibility in the basic concept. He saw the flexibility in the
business format as a tool to get MBE into the Israeli market.
The MBE concept is so flexible that I don‟t think MBE home office has all the solutions.
There‟s no way they can see all the needs of all the world and what is needed because the
mission of MBE is that we will personalize a convenient business solution. There is no
way you can think about all the system, what [services] we should give where. - Albert
By picking and choosing among the various components of the MBE business format,
Albert and his associates believed they could establish a profitable opportunity in Israel that
would be easy for potential franchisees to see. However, such an approach required a period of

6

When markets become saturated, franchise organizations often turn to increasing same store

sales.
7

A pilot store is a model store, the first to be opened in a particular geographic area, which is run by the
ML as a tangible example of how to operate a franchise unit.

17

trial and error in the pilot store to determine what the right combination of services was for the
Israeli market.
Accordingly, Albert‟s strategy was to perfect the pilot store before selling franchises
thereby proving the viability of MBE in the Israeli market and enticing an otherwise skeptical
population of potential franchisees to more easily buy into the MBE network. He believed that
such a strategy would allow for even greater growth than the fastest growing MBE networks.
Rather than expending significant amounts of time and money recruiting franchisees, as the plan
calls for, Albert instead spent the majority of his effort the first two years attempting to perfect
the pilot store. Of this time period his COO, Eitan, said, “We [were] doing in-store selling. We
[were] staying behind the counter and selling stamps and making photocopies.”

First Phase Results
At the outset of the first phase, in an attempt to adapt to the perceived characteristics of
the local environment marked by skepticism and suspicion of new franchising schemes, Albert
abandoned the underlying logic of the 52-week plan and adapted the corporate knowledge on
managing network growth to fit his own conception of key success factors. Of the 330 actions to
be taken in the first year only 68 were followed (20.6%), and the majority of these 68 were
delayed by up to six months. In terms of the seven core domains embedded in the 52-week plan,
only one that of infrastructure development concerned with the pilot store was addressed within
the first two years of operation. The rest were intentionally neglected. Even by the most
conservative estimates, this can clearly be considered a presumptive adaptation.
Not only was this deviation significant in comparison with headquarters‟ standard, which
is to fulfill all 330 actions in their proper sequence within the first year of operation, but it is also
significant in comparison with many of the other international networks, particularly those which
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were well established and growing quickly at the time MBE entered Israel. Table 1 below shows
the number of steps followed by each of the 13 different international networks in existence prior
to Israel (names are withheld for confidentiality reasons). While the number of steps Israel took
can be accurately pinpointed due to our level of access to the data, only a range can be
determined for the other networks. Data for the other networks was derived from interviews and
archival data collected as part of a larger study. While the data did not allow for identification of
the exact number of steps taken, the interviews elicited the general approach to conformity with
the MBE system, which, in combination with archival data, was sufficient to compute the ranges
included in Table 1.8
Insert Table 1 About Here

According to MBE instructions and the experience of other international MLs, by the end
of the first period, December 1997, Albert should have sold nearly 14 franchises and had over
half that number of stores already in operation. Instead, he hadn‟t sold a single franchise and
was still struggling to make the pilot store profitable. This was not as he had intended. Instead
of a perfectly functioning, highly profitable pilot store that could attract potential franchisees, the
pilot center wasn‟t even profitable and Albert had no network growth.9

8

As one would expect in most settings not all networks follow the theorized pattern exactly. While there is
not enough information on Country 3 in Table 1 to determine the cause of negative growth after year 4, the
significant positive growth by year 4 for Country 7 and by year 6 for Country 10 both may be attributable to
appropriate adaptations. Both networks, however, experienced slow initial growth as predicted. Moreover, the
correlation between conformity to the system and growth through year 5 indicates that these two networks,
especially Country 7 which experienced significant growth by year 4, may be outliers rather than the norm.
9
In fact, the pilot center did not become profitable until nearly half the final number of franchise units had
been added to the network. Nor was the pilot center even verging on breakeven at the end of 1997. Sales revenue
growth had stalled and did not increase until critical mass in the network as a whole had been achieved.
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Second Phase
In December 1997, Albert decided to send his COO, Eitan, to an MBE international
conference in Milan, Italy. Italy was one of the more successful MBE international networks
with nearly 200 stores established in a period of six years. At that conference, Eitan had an
opportunity to see a successful network firsthand. He returned to Israel with a clearer picture of
how the network was supposed to grow and the benefits of close adherence to the blueprint.
The trip to Italy was a milestone for me, I think for all of us. I think Albert will agree with
this milestone…December ‟97. It seems like every franchisor must . . . get to the point
where you say, „Okay, let‟s start listening to others and what they are doing.‟ – Eitan
From December 1997, through the next two years, Albert and his top managers at
headquarters, Eitan and Ari, shifted their policy from focusing on pilot store profitability to
following the detailed blueprint that MBE had provided. During the initial period, when they
had significantly adapted the system, they rarely asked for help with implementation problems.
Having significantly adapted the system others could not help them much. As Ari commented,
“We don‟t go back to the U.S. We have our own knowledge here,” a sentiment that Albert
echoed, “Ask the U.S. for help? It might be the proper way, but we have created our own
experience.”
In the second period, they copied the MBE system for network growth as closely as
possible and found that help in implementing the system was readily available.
We used the same process exactly and it went well. [We copied] even the small issues like
how much details you give over the phone, how much details you give in a meeting, what
type of questions people ask you and what type of answers you give, and what you don‟t
answer then but leave to a later stage. - Albert

During the preparation to implement. Albert and his management team had contact with
successful MLs, such as the Italian ML, and significant iterative contact with MBE headquarters
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in the U.S. For instance, while the basic implementation steps came from Italy they were in
frequent contact with MBE headquarters concerning materials to use and clarification of system
details. Albert commented that “some clarifications we had to ask. For these types of questions
we went to the U.S. [The director of the international department] helped us with some fine
tuning.”

Second Phase Results
The first phase was followed, in December 1997, with a decision to backtrack and reapproach the growth of the network by implementing the MBE system in the recommended way,
following the steps outlined in the 52-week plan. Within the first year of the second phase the
remaining 262 steps were followed. Thus, this phase is marked by a reversal of the previous
presumptive adaptation. Instead of following his own course, Albert implemented the original
practice as closely as possible.
During the second phase, with growth beginning almost immediately, the Israeli network
grew from only one pilot store to two pilot stores plus 15 franchise outlets in two years. Israel
was among the fastest growing young MBE networks at the time.10 At first glance, it might seem
obvious that focusing on selling franchises would increase the size of the network. While this
was the direct result of Albert‟s shift from presumptive adaptation to closer adherence to the
original practice, it was not a shift in Albert‟s original intention. His intention from the
beginning was to build a fast-growing network. The shift, then, wasn‟t from a focus on growing
the network, but from attempting to adapt the system for growing the network to fit local

10

Growth often accelerates with age, but compared with other fairly new franchise networks they were now
the second fastest growing network in MBE history.
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conditions in order to achieve better-than-typical MBE growth rate. As he began to follow the
pattern recommended by MBE, Albert was finally meeting the original growth predictions he
and MBE headquarters had established when he first bought the rights to build the MBE network
in Israel.

Third Phase
As the network grew, Albert began to have minor problems with late royalty payments.
The Israeli society is one characterized by a fear of ambiguous situations (such as the potential
success of an untried franchise format),11 a strong sense of the cost of time and money, and a
moderately strong sense of individuality12 coupled with a noted reluctance to accept and comply
with developing social norms or the expectations of others (Mann, 1977). This environmental
characteristic is most easily seen in the characterization of Israeli markets as requiring quick
validation in a fast-paced do-or-die atmosphere. As a consequence, new franchisees are under
tremendous pressure to become successful quickly.
The result of this cultural tendency in the MBE Israel network was for the franchisees to
temporarily withhold royalty payments in order to use those funds as an interest-free, short-term
loan to expand their stores as quickly as possible. The norm of on-time royalty payments, typical
in other MBE networks, was disregarded by some franchisees who were trying to swiftly recoup
their investments by capitalizing on individual growth prospects. Albert‟s approach to this
problem entailed persuasion, cajoling, negotiation, and individualized attention to the needs of
each franchisee.

11

Israel ranks 19th on Hofstede‟s (1997) cultural indices for uncertainty avoidance with a score of 82 as
compared to a U.S. score of 46 and an average across all 53 countries in his sample of 65.
12
Israel ranks 19th on Hofstede‟s (1997) cultural indices for individualism with a score of 54 as compared
to a U.S. score of 91 and an average across all 53 countries in his sample of 43.
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In the latter half of 1999, Albert decided to shift his focus to a new business. For a number
of months prior to December 1999, he slowly turned over operation of the business to Eitan, his
COO, promoting him to CEO in December of that year. Eitan had initiated the shift toward
following the pattern for network growth outlined in the 52-week plan and was instrumental in
implementing that plan. While Eitan had primarily been involved in selling new franchises, as
Albert withdrew Eitan became more involved with existing franchisees. Eitan felt that the Israeli
franchisees were different from those in other locales and would not respond sufficiently to
persuasion. As a result, when he became CEO he consistently confronted the franchisees, even to
the point of occasionally threatening a withdrawal of support from headquarters if royalty
payments were not on time. Ultimately, Eitan was successful in resolving the problems with late
royalty payments. As Albert said, “He was tough on it. He was tough on collecting the money.”
However, Eitan‟s approach to resolving the problem had resulted in significant mistrust
from the existing franchisees. Their general opinion was that Eitan was not the right person to
run the network. The strain resulted in open disputes between MBE Israel top management and
the franchisees, many of whom were sufficiently unhappy that they advised prospective
franchisees against joining the network. Existing leads soon chose not to enter the network and
the sale of new franchises halted.
In an effort to overcome the negative feelings between himself and the franchisees, Eitan
completely shifted his attention from selling new franchises to supporting existing franchisees
with the intent to increase individual store sales revenues. If existing store sales increased
quickly enough, franchisees might begin to give positive referrals again to prospective
franchisees, restarting growth. In order to maximize this support effort and hopefully overcome
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resentment quickly, Eitan hired new personnel for headquarters including marketing and
operations directors.
Part of Eitan‟s efforts at franchisee support included involvement in day-to-day franchise
operations. For instance, in an attempt to increase turnover at the unit level as well as ensure ontime royalty payments, he attempted to centralize some operations by generating business
through a centralized internet interface and then passing the business along to the franchisees.
Despite, or possibly because of, Eitan‟s efforts at supporting franchisees their mistrust only
deepened. Albert comments, “[He] was supporting them too much. You cannot help someone
else‟s business by controlling it.” By the end of 2000, the situation had deteriorated to the point
that Eitan was forced to leave the company, and Albert brought in another CEO.

Phase Three Results
The third phase is marked by presumptive adaptation in terms of significant alterations to
MBE‟s family principle and basic franchising principles such as decentralization of operations.
Typically, franchise firms are decentralized operations with the franchisor spending a large
proportion of his/her time managing the relationship with the franchisees (Bradach, 1998;
Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998). Decentralization is requisite as franchisees are owners as well as
managers. Managing the relationship between the franchisor and the franchisees is important
because, barring gross negligence, the franchisor has little ultimate authority over the franchisees
and has to rely on relationships in order to ensure their cooperation in aspects of the business
requiring coordination between franchisor and franchisee. Managing the relationship
appropriately is also vital to the growth of the network because good relationships reflect in
positive referrals to prospective franchisees.
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While Albert had always maintained a decentralized structure and been very careful in
his approach to his franchisees even when there were difficulties in the relationship, Eitan did
things differently. First, by centralizing some aspects of the business Eitan altered basic
franchising principles by changing parts of the franchisor/franchisee relationship into an
employer/employee relationship. Second, his confrontational approach to franchisee difficulties
was an abrogation of the family principle that was explicitly counter to headquarters‟
recommendations and to the approach of 93% of all MLs prior to Israel, and 84% of those who
began operations after Israel did, who followed the family principle as recommended by MBE
headquarters extremely closely.
With only one exception, prior to Israel all the MLs used a very accommodating,
persuasive interaction style coupled with extended patience and forbearance for late or nonroyalty payments and a clear respect for the franchisee as the primary interface with the
customer. For instance, nearly all of the MLs approached the issue of late royalty payments with
a lengthy process spanning six months or more that began with personal phone calls and friendly
letters of reminder. For franchisees that could not pay due to financial difficulties (which is
often interpreted broadly to include difficulties breaking even), forbearance was indefinite and
involved substantial support in helping the franchisees become profitable. This was especially
true for small networks, where failure rates and negative referrals can be especially damaging.
The following comment from the Austrian ML, concerning a franchisee that had not paid
royalties in over a year, illustrates this approach and its importance for small networks: “At the
stage we are in of our development it is very difficult to take such a decision [terminating a
franchisee]. There is the hope that gradually you will receive some part of it if not all. You tend
to take the somewhat softer approach which we are doing.”
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The result of Eitan‟s presumptive adaptation was zero network growth during his tenure
as CEO. Moreover, in his attempt to support the existing franchisees, Eitan deviated from the
system for network growth as well in terms of hiring additional personnel such as a marketing
and operations manager. The system for network growth, as outlined in the manuals given to
MLs, prescribed delaying the hire of additional headquarters employees until the network was
much larger in size. Eitan discovered why as existing monthly royalty payments, while on time
now, were insufficient by themselves to fund the extra headquarters employees. With the lack of
fees from new franchise sales, his approach quickly became financially unsustainable.

Establishing Correlation
The following figure shows the growth pattern of the MBE Israel network along with the
points demarcating the different phases where decisions concerning presumptive adaptation were
made.
Insert Figure 1 about here

There is a clear pattern concerning presumptive adaptation beginning, with a decision to
presumptively adapt the system, followed by implementing a close copy, and ending with
another decision to presumptively adapt. The dependent variable, network growth, also followed
a clear pattern. While a pilot store was operated by the ML between 1995 and 1997, no franchise
units were sold during that time. This period was followed by fast growth as 15 franchise units
were sold between 1998 and 1999. In 2000, however, the growth stalled again, with no new
stores sold between 2000 and the end of the period of observation in July 2001.
Overlaying the two patterns produces the following:
Insert Table 2 about here
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Establishing Causality
In retrospect, the MBE Israel saga could be analyzed as a naturally occurring, repeatedtreatment quasi-experiment.13 The presence of a naturally occurring, repeated-treatment quasiexperiment suggests a causal relationship between presumptive adaptation and network growth.
In this study, we follow Cook and Campbell‟s (1979) approach to quasi-experiments.
Specifically, a quasi-experimental design is aptly suited for studies where the researcher does not
have control over the incidence of the treatment, and hence cannot control randomization, but
has rich access to data and exact knowledge of when the treatment is implemented (Cook 1991).
Quasi-experiments, as in true experiments, allow one to make causal inferences, if, as in this
study, there is temporal precedence, correlation between independent and dependent variables,
and evidence or logic allowing one to address the counterfactual, or what might have occurred if
the treatment were not given (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
The quasi-experimental design that occurred in this study is a repeated-treatment design.
In this design, the treatment is applied, removed, and applied again within the same population.
It is justified when the investigator has access to only one population and the program is
introduced to the entire population (Cook, Campbell, & Peracchio, 1990). The repeated
treatment design is frequently used by researchers in other disciplines, such as psychology (e.g.,
Barlow & Hersen, 1984), and is considered to be strong, due to the repeated nature of the design,
in terms of accounting for threats to the validity of the causal inferences (Shadish et al., 2002;
Cook & Campbell, 1979). As with any quasi-experimental study, or any study where causality is

13

While we have portrayed the experiment as a set of three phases, indicating an N of three, the data
actually comprises a set of 23 quarters from September 1995 to July 2001 with the treatment being applied for the
first eight and last six of the quarters and removed during the middle nine. This extends the observations over time
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inferred for that matter, careful consideration must be given to alternative explanations.
Generally, this design is strongest when treatments are unobtrusive and are not confounded by
temporal cycles (Shadish et al., 2002). The retrospective nature of this study ensures that it is
unobtrusive. The issue of temporal cycles along with additional traditional and logical threats to
validity will be discussed in the next section.
The design is depicted below; its most interpretable outcome is when the first observation
(O1) differs from the second (O2), the third (O3) differs from the fourth (O4), and the O3-O4
difference is in the same direction as the O1-O2 difference. X indicates application of the
treatment while /X indicates its removal.
O1 X O2 / X O3 X O4
The treatment in our study occurs when the ML in Israel decides to presumptively adapt
the MBE system for network growth. If the treatment has an effect on network growth, we will
expect that growth will be stagnant after each decision to significantly adapt the system and that
growth will accelerate following a decision to implement the standardized system. That is, that
O1 (the initial growth forecast developed by Albert and MBE headquarters in San Diego) will be
higher than O2 (the observation after the decision to adapt), O3 (following the decision to
implement the standardized system) will be higher than O2, and the growth rate of O4 (following
the decision to adapt again) will be lower than O3. This is exactly what we find and what figure
1 (reported earlier) illustrates.

(King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994), increasing the statistical validity of the analysis (Shadish et al., 2002) and, as we
pursue below, allowing us to rule out the possibility that the pattern occurs randomly.
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Threats to Validity
Since the treatment is not applied randomly, inferring causality in a quasi-experimental
setting necessitates a special effort to carefully weigh alternative explanations of the observed
results. This task is particularly important in our setting because the treatment is endogenous,
meaning that additional, possibly neglected, confounding factors may be correlated with the
treatment.
However, while not completely resolving the issue, one of the strengths of a repeatedtreatment, quasi-experimental design is that potential threats to the validity of the entire pattern
have to follow the same on-off-on pattern as the treatment (the decision to presumptively adapt)
(Cook & Campbell, 1979). While we cannot completely rule out the possibility that such events
occurred, we are not aware of any event other than the treatment that followed this pattern fully.
There were other factors, such as changes in the business climate that conceivably could have
affected network growth across the entire period. However, upon scrutiny we find that these
factors remained constant across all three time periods or across at least two of the three time
periods. There may also, however, be alternative explanations to the measured results for single
periods; such factors are also explored below, as explanations for each single period of the study
may conceivably ultimately account for the entire pattern.
Concerning the economic climate of Israel, we measured both quarterly economic
indicators and average store revenue in the MBE Israel network to determine if a slowdown in
economic growth was responsible for the decline in sales of new franchises during the last part of
the period of observation. GDP increased during the entire period of the study but at a slightly
decreasing rate during the last two years of the study. We constructed a measure of elasticity
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between the economic indicators and store revenue. The elasticity14 during the entire period is
very small (ranging from -.025 to .317) and is random, with no clear pattern emerging. For the
economic climate to have been the cause of the growth changes in climate should coincide to
some degree with the pattern of network growth results. At the very least, elasticity should be
negative and high or becoming significantly higher during the first and third periods. However,
this is not the case.
Despite the overall economic climate, it is possible that lack of franchisee profitability (a
possible motive for giving negative referrals to potential franchisees), rather than Eitan‟s policy
changes, led to the decline in performance in the third period. However, for this to be the case
one would expect either a precipitous decline in store revenues (data on store profitability is not
available) at the time of Eitan‟s promotion (December 1999) or a perennial lack of profitability
with little hope for future prospects. This, however, was not the case. Accounting for month-tomonth variation in same-store sales, every single MBE Israel franchise saw steady increases in
store revenue from inception through the end of 1999, with 86% seeing a steady increase through
the end of 2000.
Calculating a six-month average for all stores in operation at least two months (to allow
for minimal learning curve effects), the average revenue for the first six months of 1999 was
14.5% higher than the last six months of 1998. The average from July to December 1999 was
another 8.0% higher than the first six months of 1999 for a year to year increase of 23.7%. The
first six months of 2000 registered a 12% decrease, although all except two increased in revenue.
Moreover, by the end of 2000, revenues had rebounded to only a 1% decrease over year-end
1999 figures, with all stores except two increasing same store revenues over that period. Even

14

Elasticities are computed as they test not only correlation but the sensitivity of franchisee performance to
even small changes in GDP.
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when decreasing the sample by increasing the required number of months in operation to three to
allow for a longer learning curve, the year-to-year increase, 1998 to 1999, is 21.6%.15 Despite
the mixed same store sales growth in 2000, lack of revenue does not seem to be the cause of the
negative performance observed in the third period. For lack of revenue to be the cause of the
observed pattern, one would expect chronic low revenue or decreasing revenue for the period
prior to Eitan‟s promotion. Otherwise, while in actuality there were no franchise sales following
Eitan‟s promotion, one would expect to see sales in at least the first six months of his tenure as
CEO. While it is possible that no new stores were scheduled to be added at that point, and
declining revenue during the first six months of 2000 (even though only a few stores were
declining) inhibited new franchisees from joining the network one would expect to see the
situation eased as revenues rebounded in the second half of 2000. Such was not the case.
A second possible threat is that the observed pattern occurred by luck alone. Across the
three phases there are a total of eight possible outcomes, ranging from three consecutive failures
to three consecutive successes and all permutations in between; if the pattern occurred by luck
alone, one would expect to find an outcome of failure, success, failure only 12.5% of the time
(each success or failure having a probability of .5). However, we can further divide the three
phases into a set of eight, nine, and six successive quarters. If the growth is random, one would
expect it to be random in each time period. However, in the first phase we have eight
consecutive no-growth quarters, which, if growth were random, would occur with a probability
of .0004. Six of the nine quarters in the second phase show growth, although only three are
consecutive, which would occur randomly less than half the time. Finally, all six of the

15

Since the same store revenue was generally increasing for all stores during this period, extending the
cutoff date for including stores in the sample will naturally decrease the year to year percentage increase. However,
even increasing the cutoff to 6 months to allow for a longer learning curve yields a 12.5% year to year increase in
sales at the time Eitan became CEO.
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consecutive quarters in the third phase have zero growth, for a probability of .016. Even if one
were to assume that the second phase was completely random, the overall probability of
observing the entire pattern if it were random is less than 1/1000th of a percentage point. Thus, it
seems unlikely that the observed pattern is not due solely to luck.
Another possible threat is that the individuals at MBE Israel learned from the application
of the treatment the first time and specifically avoided those problems the second time around.
While top management did realize that a lack of growth at the beginning was directly due to not
“listening to others” and subsequently copied the MBE system for network growth as closely as
possible, they did not connect network growth with the concept of following the system as a
whole. Instead they saw it as adherence to a particular part of that system, specifically the timing
of selling franchises, vis a vis the operation of the pilot store. This is clearly seen by the
departure from that same system during the last two years of the period of observation. At the
time, no one, including the observers, realized that the treatment being applied was a departure
from the system as a whole. The fact that the essence of the treatment was recognized
retrospectively only enhances the validity of the study.16
A fourth alternative explanation for the positive growth in the middle of the period of
observation is that Albert was correct that by perfecting the pilot store before selling franchises
resulted in excellent growth. This, however, was not the case, because the pilot stores were
never able to break even until after there were sufficient numbers in the network to bring up the

16

Campbell & Overman (1988) reach a similar conclusion about the likelihood of social threats to validity
in their study of the Connecticut crackdown on speeding.
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average revenue of all the stores in the network. Beyond that, such a scenario would not explain
the zero growth observed at the end of the period.
Another potential explanation for the positive growth could be a lag between
demonstration of the MBE business and actual franchisee recruitment. A time lag, however, of
nearly two years between demonstration of the concept and sale of the franchise would be
required if this were the cause of the pattern found in the data. Moreover, the data indicate that
the average time from demonstration to franchise sale was less than four months during the
period in question.
A sixth potential threat is that factors correlated with Eitan‟s promotion to CEO were
responsible for the zero growth following that action. Such factors could be an increase in
pressure for financial performance due to Albert‟s shift to a passive investor or possibly changes
in Eitan‟s compensation package. Such factors, however, while being an alternative or
complementary explanation for the decision to confront the franchisees concerning late royalty
payments and for the decision to institute centralized operations do not alter the conclusion that
Eitan‟s policy changes did in fact conflict with the family principle. Nor do such factors address
the negative reaction of the franchisees, which, according to all accounts, was in direct response
to changes initiated by Eitan.
A final threat to validity is that turnover in the MBE network caused either the pattern of
growth or the pattern of decline in the third period. This could occur either through widespread
turnover in headquarters or, a large-scale change in the way the business was operated outside of
the changes detailed in the case. Through the period of observation, however, there were only
incidental personnel changes at headquarters and, outside of the adherence to the 52-week plan,
intentional changes in the franchisor/franchisee relationship, and Eitan‟s attempt at
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centralization, there were no major changes in the way the business was operated. Eitan‟s
promotion to CEO was a major determinant in the second decision to deviate from the system for
network growth. His promotion, however, did not result in a major change in other operating
policies. Albert had been slowly removing himself from daily operations for some time before
the promotion, leaving Eitan in charge of the day-to-day decisions and the actual operation of the
network. The key change in Eitan‟s promotion was that Eitan, rather than Albert, became the
primary ML interface with the franchisee. The centralization of operations is obviously a major
operating change. However, both pilot center and franchisee revenues grew during this period.
Moreover, while it was a radical change for the operation of the stores, this paper is about
adaptations of the system for network growth, and the primary change in this policy in that
regard was intrusion in the operation of stores and attempting to manage franchisees by fiat.
Finally, we recognize that there may be instability in the measures or other unmeasured
factors that might account for the results. While this is the case with most studies, this threat is
typically heightened in a naturally occurring quasi-experiment due to the often endogenous
nature of policy changes. However, while the possibility of significant, omitted variables may be
higher, the repeated-treatment design substantially mitigates this threat. Moreover, data were
gathered in real-time, as the events unfolded, over a seven-year period. During and beyond that
entire period we had full access to the major parties, allowing us to follow closely the
development of the MBE Israel network. During the period of observation and during interviews
with all the principal players, no factors other than those discussed here emerged as either major
policy changes or external factors that may have caused the observed pattern. Other than the
treatment, we know of no factors which were applied, removed, and reapplied and are unaware
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of any major omitted variables which might possibly account for shifts in performance in any
given time period.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Developing counterexamples is a standard part of creative research to determine the
limitations of a proposed approach. An example of an approach that did not work as desired may
point to serious shortcomings in the current system of beliefs, unless it is a bizarre case that is
relatively rare and can safely be ignored. However, if the example points to a failure that could
affect an important segment of the relevant population, a change in existing policy may be
required. Presumably these investigations will lead to changes in policy or procedures to reduce
the chances of recurrence (Hoaglin, Light, McPeek, Mosteller, & Stoto, 1982).
We believe that MBE Israel is a representative counterexample to conventional wisdom
concerning presumptive adaptation. The example is representative to the extent that the setting is
similar to that faced by other franchisees and to the extent to which franchisees and others
engaged in transfers of complex knowledge ascribe the same meaning to the adaptation decision
as Albert did (Ilgen, 1986). In other words, generalizability of the MBE Israel example would be
compromised if the setting of Israel is an outlier.
Evidence from within the international MBE community, other franchising contexts, and
the transfer of organizational practices outside of franchising indicates that the results obtained
by Albert are not atypical. For instance, the correlation between the number of steps in the 52week plan followed and the number of franchisees added each year for the entire MBE
international network begins at .86 (statistically significant at the .05 level) in the second year of
ML operation and decreases slowly to .51 by the eighth year, remaining statistically significant
through the fifth year of operation. The correlation was computed using the most conservative
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estimate (least number of steps followed for high conformers and most for low conformers) and
suggests that our findings for MBE Israel are consistent with the experience of the larger MBE
international network.
Moreover, through interviews conducted as part of a larger study involving knowledge
transfer within the international MBE network, we found that nearly all of the MBE MLs have
faced the issue of presumptive adaptation with varying decisions and varying results. Some
MLs17 utilized an approach similar to Albert‟s and presumptively adapted the MBE system for
network growth, with the same tendency towards low growth results.
Other MLs adapted presumptively but to a lesser degree (neglecting some, albeit fewer,
steps in the 52-week plan) and found that adaptation created difficulties that slowed and even
reversed growth. For example, one particular ML devoted significant up-front time altering lead
generation materials to “ensure” a greater fit with local culture with the intent to thereby increase
the rate of network growth. While such a move may have been warranted, the focus on changing
the materials required significant time and money that needed to be spent on other aspects of
network growth, impairing the MLs ability to support existing franchisees and eventually
resulting in a revenue shortfall. The revenue shortfall led to a vicious cycle where lack of
resources to spend on lead generation slowed down network growth, which in turn curtailed
support and revenue growth. Ultimately the ML ended the affiliation with MBE due to financial
duress. This example highlights the causally ambiguous nature of the template with its
subsequent ambiguous interdependencies and suggests that even relatively moderate presumptive
adaptations may also harm network performance.

17

Names withheld for confidentiality reasons.
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Other MLs chose to follow the MBE system as closely as possible, with results opposite
to Albert‟s initial results. For instance, the Italian ML commented, “Our system is very close to
the U.S. . . There was no point in buying a concept and then doing something else. . . We do it
exactly like the U.S., not only in image but in business.”
Yet other MLs realized the need to adapt, but chose to begin that adaptation from a
faithful replica of the original practice, and then incrementally adapting only after the practice
was sufficiently understood in the local context (not until significant time had passed). The
Canadian ML, for instance, faithfully followed the U.S. model for both network growth and the
business format for the first three to four years of operation. At that point, he began to slowly
adapt the business format by incrementally emphasizing the sale of document services over
shipping. To support this shift in the business format, he gradually shifted the lead generation
process (a focus on document services requires a more technologically sophisticated franchisee)
as well as the substance of the training franchisees received.
“I said „hey, this [the original MBE model] is a pretty successful concept,‟ and I still
believe it is probably one of the most successful, if not the most successful, service
concepts in the world. . . . So, [concerning modifications] I went kind of slow to start
with.” - Canadian ML
As reported in Table 1 previously, the results of these MLs are in stark contrast to those
of Albert and others who engaged in presumptive adaptation.
Our conclusions could be generalized beyond MBE to the extent to which the lessons are
transferable to other settings (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). In the domain of franchising, such
lessons seem especially applicable to organizations relying on a ML system. More generally,
however, the MBE Israel example speaks to the broader phenomenon of adaptation in the
transfer of franchising knowledge to franchisees at all levels. For instance, the proclivity for
presumptive adaptation seems to be characteristic of franchising in general, not just MBE, and
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not just of the method for franchising growth. Franchisees often attempt to improve on the
franchise system that they join by immediately introducing major modifications because they
believe that they can quickly improve its profitability in their unique situation (Kaufmann &
Eroglu, 1998; Seid & Thomas, 2000).
Not only does this seem to be a decision commonly approached, but the pattern of results
obtained at MBE Israel also seems to be characteristic of other franchisees. Franchisees in
general are explicitly warned to refrain from significant adaptation by franchisors as well as by
franchising experts, and many franchisees have learned the same lesson that Albert did (Bradach,
1998; Seid & Thomas, 2000). Some franchisors, recognizing this pattern, have enacted policies
to overcome it. For example, Great Harvest Bread Co. requires that its franchisees adhere
closely to the original practice, allowing incremental modifications only after at least a year has
passed (Great Harvest Bread, 1999).
While, to some extent, franchising may be a specialized setting because the locus of
adaptation often lies with the recipient rather than headquarters, policies acknowledging the
potential difficulties in presumptive adaptation occur in contexts other than franchising.
Knowledge transfer policies at Xerox Europe and Intel are illustrative of the potential
generalizability outside of the franchising domain. Xerox Europe, which has a long and
distinguished history transferring best practices, demands that receiving units copy the practice
exactly as it is performed at the source until it is able to achieve similar results (Financial Times,
1997). Intel also utilizes this “copy exact” policy when establishing new semi-conductor fabs,
requiring engineers to replicate fab designs and work practices with exactitude (McDonald,
1998). In other words, both organizations strongly discourage presumptive adaptation.
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The MBE Israel case thus suggests that the seemingly sensible idea of presumptively
adapting a practice to fit a particular environment, to be responsive to local institutions, or to
attempt to anticipate local isomorphic pressures may be counterproductive when transferring an
insufficiently understood practice across borders. This finding, at the very least, suggests that
presumptive adaptation is an important managerial choice that has thus far received little
consideration. The decision to presumptively adapt is different from the decision to initiate the
transfer and deserves consideration in its own right. This finding is also a note of caution against
engaging in extensive presumptive adaptation.
An important question, then, is how different from the original practice can an adaptation
effort be before the diagnostic value of the original template is effectively lost, i.e., before it
becomes comparatively more efficient to resort to trial and error than to continue to use the
original for diagnosis. For moderately complex practices, however, even a small departure from
the original may create major problems. This sensitivity to the adaptation is compounded by the
fact that the host environment is often not well understood, even by the receiving unit. Nor,
given the fact that the practice is new to the receiving unit, is the interaction between the adapted
practice and systemic effects likely to be completely understood (Ghoshal & Westney, 1993).
Thus, presuming that adaptation can be planned and implemented in advance entails presuming
extraordinary understanding and foresight not just for the recipient (the usual subject) but the
source as well. Yet, long term use of an identical replica of the original practice may turn out to
be unrealistic. Indeed, some obvious features may even have to be modified from the start.
MBE Israel‟s experience suggests that the fact that a practice will eventually be adapted
to fit the local environment does not necessarily mean that presumptive adaptation is necessary,
i.e., that the form of departure, or implemented form of the practice, be a significantly modified
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one. In this sense, the MBE case serves as a striking counterexample to such an assumption.
Beginning the transfer process by introducing modifications to a working practice before
implementing it in another location, or beginning the adaptation process with a large change
from the original, could have deleterious consequences.
This suggests some additional hypotheses for further research. First, the presumption that
a practice can be implemented without using the original as a referent is likely to lead to a form
of departure, or degree of adaptation, that is significantly different form the original practice.
Second, the reverse is also likely true, a healthy regard for the difficulty of transferring practices
and the value of the original as a diagnostic tool is likely to lead to implementing a close replica
of the original. Finally, given MBE Israel‟s experience, a more general hypothesis would be that
presumptive adaptation is likely to lead to transfer failure, while copying the original as closely
as possibly is likely to lead to transfer success. Counter intuitively, arriving at a final fit with a
local environment may be greatly facilitated by beginning with a replica that helps preserve, as
much as possible, the diagnostic value of the working example rather than one aimed at creating
fit as quickly as possible.

Table 1: Steps Followed in 52-Week Plan and Network Growth

Country

Min. # of
steps in 52week plan
followed

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

259
259
238
196
131
131
68
68
68

Max. # of
steps in 52week plan
followed *

335
335
316
244
210
210
103
103
103

Cumulative
# franchises
sold after 2
years

Cumulative
# franchises
sold after 4
years

Cumulative
# franchises
sold after 6
years**

Cumulative
# franchises
sold after 8
years**

19
14
22
11
3
6
5
3
2

23
62
31
93
8
29
20
10
11

96
53
28
169
16
27
34
15
11

168
53
20
325
25
13
43
13
5
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10
68
103
4
13
25
11
68
103
3
7
5
12
68
103
1
5
11
13
68
103
2
6
5
Israel
68
68
0
6
12
* Out of 330/335 possible steps (5 of the steps are only for those with an area franchisee
structure).
** Cumulative number also includes stores closed.
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5
14
9
12

Table 2: Correlation between Presumptive Adaptation and Network Growth

Degree of
Adaptation
# New Franchises
Sold

1995-1997
Presumptive
Adaptation
0
(2 pilot stores in
operation by ML)

1998-1999
System Copied
Closely

2000-2001
Presumptive
Adaptation

15

0
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Figure 1
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APPENDIX A
Persons Interviewed, by Job Title

Number

MBE Headquarters, San Diego, CA, USA
CEO
Executive Vice President in charge of Sales
Director of International Operations
Director of International Sales
Director of International Franchise Business Development
Director of International Training
MBE Israel Headquarters, Tel Aviv, Israel
CEO
COO
Director of Operations
Assistant Director of Operations
Director of Marketing
Franchisees in Israeli Network
Suppliers of Israeli Network

1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
4
2

APPENDIX B
The MBE statement of culture and core values reproduced below (italics added for emphasis)
can be found at the following web address: http://www.mbe.com/ambe/cacu.html.

MBE Culture
At MBE, we pride ourselves on maintaining an atmosphere of teamwork and camaraderie, a
spirit that permeates our entire corporate culture. For this reason, we refer to the collective
network of MBE corporate employees and franchisees as the MBE Family.
We understand the importance of a comfortable work environment that fosters growth, both
personally and professionally. Our primary goal is to focus on customer intimacy while adhering
to our core values of caring, honesty, fairness, integrity, trust, respect, commitment and
accountability. A shared mission and core values are the heart and soul of the Mail Boxes Etc.
culture. The MBE mission statement and core values have permanence because they grew out of
a collaborative process that included every member of the MBE corporate office team.
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Our Mission Statement
Making business easier worldwide through our service and distribution network, delivering
personalized and convenient business solutions with world-class customer service.

Our Core Values
Respect, Accountability, Fairness, Trust, Caring, Commitment, Honesty and Integrity
Likewise, the officers who comprise the MBE Leadership Council wholeheartedly embrace the
concept of "servant leadership" in their dealings with members of the MBE family. They, too,
recognize that when we treat one another as "customers" we create an environment in which
mutually beneficial relationships are developed and nurtured.
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